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opinion. 126 The alternative view argues that LGBTQ rights are the result
of hard-fought legislative and legal battles with these same dissenters and
that equality will not be secure until, as a result of education and social
pressure, such views have become so marginal as to be unacceptable.
The former is a modus vivendi approach to the essentially contested
question of sexual orientation. It does not insist on resolution of debates over
status versus conduct. Religionists can continue to believe and teach the
moral superiority of sexual expression in the context of opposite-sex
marriage. They must concede, however,that society has legislated against
discrimination and hatred against persons of LGBT orientation and to confer
legal recognition on their relationships with each other. This leaves some
space for dissenters at various levels by limiting discriminatory actions,
providing exceptions for distinctively religious activities and organizations,
where the conflict over the nature of orientation is most acute, and leaving
the realm of belief largely untouched.
The rise and ascendancy of LGBTQ rights in Canada and the U.K.
has taken place over a single generation. It should be no surprise then
that not everyone has found it easy to adjust beliefs based on deep
convictions while the societal consensus and the legal environment have
shifted around them. Conscience claims by religious conservatives do not
threaten the new order but they do challenge its liberal credentials to the
core. To (once again) quote Justice Campbell in the Nova Scotia
Barristers 'Society decision:
The discomforting truth is that religions with views that many Canadians
find incomprehensible or offensive abound in a liberal and multicultural
society. The law protects them and must carve out a place not only
where they can exist but flourish. 127

126

A. Koppelman, "You Can't Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay
People Should Have Religious Exemptions" (2006) 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 125.
127
TWUv. NSBS, infra, note 125, at 271.

Should Conscie iN

Proxya for

RelIigion in Some
Richard Haigh*

I. INTRODUCTION: IMMUNIZATION IN ONTARIO AND A
FRACAS AT YORK UNIVERSITY

Two seemingly disparate case studies provide a fascinating lens
through which to examine religion in the public sphere. One involves the
government's mandate to immunize school children and the allowable
exemptions therefrom; the other a professor's online course that requires
some group sessions on weekends, and a student's claim for an exemption
from that activity.
1. A Religious and Conscience Exemption from Immunization

The Ontario Immunization of School Pupils Act' allows parents to
exempt their children from the mandatory program of vaccination for
diseases such as diphtheria, measles, mumps, poliomyelitis, rubella, and
tetanus. The policy behind the Act is simple: parents must ensure that their
children complete a prescribed program of immunization in relation to
each of a number of designated diseases. Parents are entitled to exempt
their child from the mandatory program on two bases: (i) a religious or
conscience-based belief that runs counter to immunization; or (ii) a healthrelated reason as determined by a physician or specified nurse.

*
Assistant professor, Osgoode Hall Law School; director of the York Centre for Public
Policy and Law. Thanks to Amy Lee for research assistance and help with the York University
religious-exemption case, Lillianne Cadieux-Shaw for research assistance, Barry Bussey and lain
Benson for inviting me to participate in the Canadian Council of Christian Charities symposium on
"Religion: A Public and Social Good", and the engaging discussion that took place after I spoke on
this topic at the symposium. All have helped me refine my thoughts considerably.
R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.1 [hereinafter the "Act"]. It bears noting that Bill 198, tabled in the
legislature on May 12, 2016, proposed amending the Act to require those parents seeking a nonmedical exemption from immunization to first undergo an education session. The Bill received first
reading but at the time of writing has not progressed further.
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The Act is relatively straightforward, so it is worth quoting the
relevant sections in their entirety:

A short two years later, the Act was amended to add "conscience" to
the religious exemption (amendments also increased penalties for noncompliance). In the Hansard debates over the amendment, the then-new
Minister of Health, Keith Norton, stated that the revisions will

3. (1) The parent of a pupil shall cause the pupil to complete the
prescribed program of immunization in relation to each of the
designated diseases.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the parent of a pupil in respect of
the prescribed program of immunization in relation to a designated
disease specified by a physician or a registered nurse in the extended
class in a statement of medical exemption filed with the proper medical
officer of health and, where the physician or registered nurse in the
extended class has specified an effective time period, only during the
effective time period.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a parent who has filed a statement
of conscience or religious belief with the proper medical officer of
health.
The defmition section clarifies some of the terms above as follows:
"'designated diseases' means diphtheria, measles, mumps, poliomyelitis,
rubella, tetanus and any other disease prescribed by the Minister of
Health and Long-Term Care" and
"statement of conscience or religious belief' means a statement by
affidavit in the prescribed form by a parent of the person named in the
statement that immunization conflicts with the sincerely held convictions
of the parent based on the parent's religion or conscience...
The religious exemption was first introduced when the Act was passed
in 1982. At the time, Larry Grossman, the Progressive Conservative health
minister, stated that the legislation would virtually eliminate measles,
rubella or German measles, diphtheria, tetanus, polio, and mumps. The
mandatory nature of the provision was incorporated in an attempt to
ensure "herd immunity". To this effect, parents had to show proof of their
immunization. The Act did, however, allow parents to exempt their
children for medical and religious reasons but not for conscience-based
reasons.' The Opposition approved of the legislation as well, noting the
importance of the provisions safeguarding religious viewpoints.'

extend the grounds for exemption from the immunization requirements
to include grounds of conscience.
At present, exemptions from compulsory immunization are allowed
only on medical grounds or because of religious beliefs. A few children
in the province have been excluded from school because of parental
convictions that, though not religious, represent strong and deeply held
philosophical views. We believe the law should respect these personal
convictions.
This amendment is particularly appropriate in the light of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees freedom of conscience
and religion. We are advised by the Attorney General (Mr. McMurtry)
that the broader exemption provision would be more consistent with the
letter and the spirit of the Charter.'
As he said later, during the Bill's second reading, the added exemption
was not expected to affect the overall efficiency of the program. Minister
Norton noted that since its inception in 1982 the religious exemption had
been claimed by only 0.125 per cent of the pupils assessed to that date.
Adding a conscience objection would not likely exceed 0.25 per cent of
the school population.' Ultimately, it was the Government's belief that
including conscience would ensure the entire Bill complied with the
Charter's (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) intent.7 The Bill
passed into law with little fanfare.
Rare for a statute centred on rights, the Act enjoyed virtually universal
support. The opposition Liberal party spokespersons congratulated the
Progressive Conservative party for timely legislation, both in its original
form and the amended 1984 version. Only a few, modest, reservations
were observed:
Mr. Sweeney: I want to take a minute to draw to the minister's attention
that, because this conscience clause has been put in, some people in
Ontario are going to have a small problem for some people it may be a
very large problem in regard to the measles vaccine.
-

-

2

JcL,s.1.
Ontario Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 32nd Par!., 2nd session
(June 29, 1982).
Id., Ross McClellan, MPP Beliwoods,

Ontario Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 32nd Par!., 4th
session (November 13, 1984) [hereinafter "Hansard Debates"].
6
Id. But see statistical results below at note 11 and accompanying text.
Id, Hon. Keith Norton, December 11, 1982.
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I would like to read a couple of comments into the record. I have a
letter from one of my constituents that I was asked to bring to the
minister's attention. 'When people feel so trapped in an ethical problem
they can see no way out.. this I will admit is where many people
may feel they would be, once aware of the situation regarding live
attenuated vaccines.'

The latest statistics related to exemption requests are contained in the
report Immunization Coverage Report for School Pupils: 2012-13 School
Year and show the following: in 2013, the exemptions for religion/
conscience were much higher than exemptions for medical reasons/
prior immunity (1.3-2.0% of the seven-year-old school population for
religion/conscience reasons, depending on disease, as compared to prior
immunity (0-0.1%) and medical reasons (0.1-0.4%)). Exemptions from
polio (in 2013, 2.0% of seven-year-olds) and tetanus (1.7%) have
steadily increased from 2008 to 2013. The MMR vaccine has the fewest
number of exemptions (approximately 1 5%).11 Even at these levels, the
percentage is still significantly higher than Norton's prediction that
religious/conscience exemptions would not exceed 0.25 per cent of the
school population; however, since the form does not distinguish, the
specific breakdown between religious- versus conscience-based exemptions
is unknown.
The Report provides little more than a tentative conclusion. "It appears,"
it states, "that religious or philosophical exemptions may be increasing over
time in Ontario as evidenced by an increasing proportion of 7-year-old
students reporting religious and conscientious objections to tetanus and
polio over the period of 2008-09 to 2012_13 . 12 This is rendered even more
tentative by a recognition that the five-year time frame is likely too short to
draw firm conclusions given that the MIIVIR exemptions have remained
relatively stable over the same period.

The minister is well aware that it has been brought to our attention that
these vaccines come from human cell culture that originally came from
aborted foetuses.... The point my constituent has drawn to my attention
that this new legislation she finds herself, as a matter of conscience,
'trapped in an ethical problem'.
[T]here may be a considerable
number of people who also find themselves trapped in this ethical
problem [due to the source of the vaccine].'
...

Minister Norton assured Mr. Sweeney that a foetus had never been
aborted anywhere in the world for the purpose of manufacturing a
vaccine.
Robert Nixon, Liberal MPP for Brant-Oxford, feared that adding
conscience would greatly increase the number of requests for exemptions
and that the reasons for doing so would be trivial. As he said in the
legislature, adopting the persona of a curious child, "Daddy, do I have
to [get the needle]?" He went on: "There are people who will say,
'No honey, you do not have to get the needle'.... [It] is broadened to the
point where any kind of objection—I hesitate to use the word 'rational'
in this connection
—is at least referred to in the bill."' In other words,
Nixon was concerned that adding "conscience" as a basis for exemption
could not be controlled in the way that a purely religious exemption
could be. Norton did not respond to this floodgate concern.
The Act has now been in place for almost 30 years. The process for
obtaining an exemption is simple and has remained unchanged since
1984. Parents must complete a pro forma affidavit stating simply that the
requirements of the Act "conflict with my sincerely held convictions
based on my religion or conscience" and sign it. There is no requirement
to indicate on which of the two bases the exemption is sought. No further
details are required regarding the specifics of the religious or
conscientious belief. The affidavit is then filed with the Medical Officer
of Health.10
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Id., John Sweeney, MPP Kitchener-Wilmot.
Id., Robert Nixon, Brant-Oxford-Norfolk.
10
It should be noted that the Act does have some potentially differential consequences for
those children who have received an exemption from inoculation. According to s. 12 of the Act,

2. A Religious Exemption at a University
In September 2013, a male student living in the Greater Toronto Area
(GTA) and enrolled in an online sociology course at York University
requested to be opted out of a mandatory group assignment that required
him to meet with his female classmates in person. His reason for wanting to
be exempt from the group assignment was that his religion prevented him
from associating with women in public. Initially, Professor J. Paul Grayson,
the instructor, dismissed the request out of concern that it would give tacit

pupils who have received an exemption can be excluded from school if an outbreak of any of the
named diseases occurs.
11
Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion (Public Health Ontario), Immunization
Coverage Report for School Pupils: 2012-13 School Year (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario
2014) [hereinafter the "Report"].
12
Id.
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support to a negative view of women and set a disturbing precedent that
sexist attitudes are acceptable at the University.
In addition to personally rejecting the student's request, however,
Grayson forwarded the student's request to his dean and the director of
York's Centre for Human Rights. Grayson's hope was that the School
could, in his opinion, "give a principled response" to the student that
would back up his own decision. In a surprise turn, both the Dean and
the Centre ordered Grayson to accommodate the student's request. At the
risk of possible discipline, Professor Grayson refused the order. The
School contacted the student to let him know that he was allowed to
withdraw from the course with full refund.
The Dean of the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies,
Martin Singer,replied to Grayson in an open letter sent to the whole
faculty, writing that two key factors underlay his decision. First, because
the course was listed and offered exclusively as an online course, the
student had a reasonable expectation that he would not be obliged to
come to campus or to interact with other students in person. Singer cited
the fact that an alternative arrangement to the in-person group assignment
was made for another student of the same course who was taking the
course abroad. Second, the University was bound by its obligations under
the Ontario Human Rights Code to accommodate a student's religious
beliefs. The Code mandates accommodation upon the satisfaction of
three conditions: (1) the applicant is sincere in his convictions; (2) the
accommodation must have no substantial impact on other students'
experience in the class; and (3) the accommodation must not undermine
the academic integrity of the course. The Dean's office, the University's
Centre for Human Rights, the Office of the University Counsel, and the
Office of Faculty Relations believed that the three conditions were met in
this particular instance.13
The matter did not end there. Grayson responded to the Dean's letter,
arguing that a commitment to gender equality should not be overborne by
a claim for religious accommodation, even if it fits within the scope of
the Code. In Grayson's mind, to do otherwise was inconsistent with
York's core values and would have infringed upon the right of female
students to be treated with respect by male students. He held firm to the
view that if York University was legally bound by the Code to make the

13

J. Paul Grayson response to Dean Martin Siliger, entitled "Erosion of Rights of Female
Students in York's Classrooms", dated December 9, 2013, at 2 (copy with author).
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decision that it did, then the Code itself was unacceptable and in need of
reform. 14
Grayson also referenced what he saw as missing, but crucially
relevant, information in the Dean's reasons. In terms of a student's
reasonable expectation of distance learning via an online course, Grayson
pointed out that the student at the centre of the controversy had come to
campus on at least two other occasions to participate in other in-person
courses. As well, Grayson believed that the course syllabus provided
adequate notice to students that there would be a component of the
course requiring in-person group attendance. Grayson also rejected the
Dean's position that the student's religious accommodation request was
analogous to the student who lived outside Canada. He saw the former as
a request made on the basis of preference, whereas the latter was, to him,
based on a real inability to attend in-person meetings.
Moreover, Grayson contended that the proposed accommodation
would have a substantial impact on other students' experiences in the
class and therefore did not meet the second requirement of the Code.
Like any good sociologist, he based this on a survey he had subsequently
conducted in one of his classes, which used a fictitious scenario almost
identical to the one that occurred. The results of the survey indicated
that the accommodation would have led some female members of the
class to feel belittled and humiliated. Out of 30 female students surveyed,
15 female students indicated they would find the accommodation
"ridiculous", "unfair", "offensive", "upsetting", "discriminating",
"outrageous", "disappointing", or "confusing" or perceive it as a sign of
favouritism, ranging in degree of negative reaction from mild to extreme.
Of course, this meant that 15 female students respected or were indifferent
to the male student's request for accommodation; of those, six approved
and fully supported the decision to accommodate the student's minority
religious belief. 15
York's sociology department sided with Grayson, passing a motion
on October 9, 2013, stating that "whereas it is recognized that York
recognizes diversity, be it resolved that academic accommodations for
students will not be made if they contribute to material or symbolic
marginalization of other students, faculty or teaching assistants"." After

Id.
Id., at 9-11.
Cited in id., at 5.
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several unsuccessful attempts to sway the University's decision, Grayson
broke the story to the media in January 2014.
Predictably, when it comes to contentious religious matters, the story
went viral. Much criticism and many comments came from a wide swath
of members of the public. Even federal politicians, who in some sense
should have no business discussing religious accommodation in the
university sector, couldn't contain themselves. On Thursday, January 9,
2014, Justice Minister Peter Mackay piped up, saying that "we did
not send soldiers to Afghanistan to protect the rights of women to
only see those same rights eroded here at home." He was joined by
federal opposition leader Tom Mulcair, who also spoke out against the
University's decision.17 At the provincial level, the Parti Québécois
Minister responsible for Democratic Institutions, Bernard Drainville, and
Ontario's Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities, Brad Duguid,
also sided with Professor Grayson. Duguid acknowledged that the
University had the authority to make its own decisions but added that "our
universities should not be obliged to alter course curriculum in any way
that would be seen as discriminatory with regard to gender equality."
He considered this to be a "sacrosanct" principle."
York did have its supporters. Raj Anand, a human rights lawyer and
former Chief Commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission,
opined that the University's decision was legally defensible, as religiousaccommodation laws are designed to protect individuals against majority
opinion. Alan Shefinan, a former director of communication and education
with the Ontario Human Rights Commission, also affirmed York's
decision to accommodate the student's request as a fair balancing of the
factual circumstances of the request.19

17

Both quotations come from T. Hopper, "York University standing by choice to excuse
student from group work with women over religious beliefs", National Post, January 9, 2014,
available online: <http://news.nationalpost.con1toronto/yorkuniver5ity..appearstobe5tdjgy
18

Quoted in J. Bradshaw and A. Morrow, "York President Weighs in on religious rights
controversy, calls for discussion", The Globe and Mail, January 13, 2014, available online:
<httP:/!www.theglobeandmail.con1Jnews/national/educatiojyorkpresjdentweighsinonreljgjos
rights-controversycajls_fordiscussiopJicle1632o159/>
19
R. Anand, "Accommodation issue shows human rights principles are working", Toronto
Star, January 18, 2014, available online: <http://www,thestar.com]opinionlconljnentary/2014/01/18/
accommodationJssueshows human rights_principles are working.html>
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The general feeling in the media, however, seemed to be that the
University had got it wrong. The typical response was that religious
freedoms did not operate in isolation and needed to be considered
alongside other fundamental rights and values. Christopher D'Souza, an
equity expert and author, challenged the University's opinion that the
accommodation was not creating undue hardship for the women: "[t]he
message [that the University] sent about gender equality was very
skewed", he stated .2' David Matas, a lawyer specializing in human rights
law, noted that distinctions needed to be made between freedom of
call them external restraints on freedom of
religion in a public setting
the
and
freedom
of
religion
within a religious context
religion
internal debates over what is contemplated as religious. Discrimination
that exists within a religion should not, for him, be projected into the
public sphere via a simplistic claim of freedom of religion. This could
potentially violate the rights of people who hold different religious
beliefs or have no religion .2 ' Both Matas and D'Souza were of the
opinion that, although there is no fixed hierarchy of human rights, the
right to gender equality must predominate in this particular context.
To defend the University's decision from the public criticism, York
Provost Rhonda Lenton tried to decouple the student's religious motivations
from the online nature of the course. In an official statement from
the University, and in a number of newspaper and radio interviews, she
argued that if the student had made the same request in an in-class
course, it would have been highly unlikely that the University would
have agreed to grant the accommodation request. In her statement she
noted that "[a] s a secular institution, [York has an] expectation that males
and females study alongside one another," reminding everyone that
"accommodation is not limitless"." In a CBC Radio interview, she
emphasized that the School does not prioritize religious accommodation
over other types of rights and strove to point out that accommodation of
pluralistic values is in fact made to encourage individuals to engage with
public institutions. She made a personal promise to review York's
decision-making processes regarding religious accommodation with
-

-

-

20
Quoted in L. Buck, "York University student incident creates a national debate", The
Cord, January 15, 2015, available online: <http:llwww.thecord.caIyorkuniversity-5tudentincident
createsanational-debate>.
21
Id.
22
"Statement from Rhonda Lenton, provost and vice-president academic", y File, January 9,
2014, available online: <http://yfile ,news.yorku,caJ2014/01/09/yOrkCOmmittethtOcreatingan
inclusivelearningenvironmentforall/>.
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other Ontario universities to "share the best way forward in these types
of requests"."
Lenton's responses were insufficient to placate some commentators,
which led inevitably to the matter escalating to York's President and
Vice-Chancellor, Mandouh Shoukri. On January 13, 2014, he released a
statement on religious accommodation. In it, he emphasized that every
request for accommodation is considered according to the individual
merits of the request, with a view to reaching all decisions in a fair and
reasonable manner. Surrounding all such requests was the context of the
School as a secular institution. He referenced an earlier "Presidential
Statement on the Secular University" issued by York in 2007, which
affirmed York as a "tolerant, diverse and multicultural place" where
"democratic and pluralistic values of Canadian society" are reflected.
The 2007 statement forewarns that "those who have strong commitments
to various faith communities or political ideologies may find their beliefs
challenged by others." It reminded everyone that "religious accommodation
cannot be implemented at the expense of the infringement of the rights
of others."24
As with much that captivates the media these days, the matter ended
almost as abruptly as it started. The student at the centre of the controversy
reached a resolution with Professor Grayson, and he eventually met with
his co-ed group. According to Grayson, the student was ultimately satisfied
that the matter was handled fairly, although he continued to maintain that
his religion did allow for exceptions of this nature.25

sometimes as singular and tragic events, such as the massacre of Charlie
Hebdo staff in Paris.
For the most part, Canada's broad and open immigration policies,
multiculturalism, increased diversity, and pluralism have combined to
give rise to an amazing social and cultural mosaic, but they have no
doubt also contributed to flashpoints like the one at York. Accommodating
religious beliefs can be complex, partly because of the nearly infinite
ways in which religious beliefs are manifested and partly because there is
a need among the non-religious or differently religious to adopt an
imaginative perspective regarding beliefs and practices that is not always
achievable.
The Supreme Court of Canada's test for assessing whether something
is religious is tremendously broad. To meet the test, all one need do is
such as not sitting down face-to-face with female
show that a practice
is, firstly, connected with a higher purpose. That higher
students
purpose itself is not easily established. But as the majority of the
Supreme Court put it in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, at least if the
outer limits are defined as "beliefs, convictions and practices rooted
in religion, as opposed to those that are secular, socially based or
conscientiously held," it is safe to say that they are protected by the
guarantee of freedom of religion.26 The majority went on to note that
"religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of
faith and worship" that tends to manifest itself as a "belief in a divine,
superhuman or controlling power, "27
Second, the practice that must be related to the belief is one that is
in
almost entirely within the subjective appreciation of the claimant
this case, that the student's own understanding of his religion forbids
sitting down with women. This subjectivity allows a near infinite variety
of practices: no one has to cite scripture or refer to religious experts to
support their position. A religion is pretty much one's own. All one need
do is assert, in good faith and sincerely, that a particular practice or belief
has a nexus with religion .2' Again, to quote directly from the majority
decision in Amselem, these are "deeply held personal convictions or

II. WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN?
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Clashes like the one at York are becoming common in the west
sometimes playing out as small incidents in classrooms and workplaces,

-

23

"Overruled?", Metro Morning, January 10, 2014, available online: <http://www.cbc.cal
metromorning/episodes/2014/01/1o/oveled/>
24
"Statement from York University President Mamdough Shoukri on Religious
Accommodation", January 13, 2014, available online: <http://yfile ,news.yorku.caJ20 14/01/13/
and "Presidential Statement on the Secular University", dated February 8, 2007, available online:
%20The%20Secular%20University.pdf> ("2007 Statemnt").
25
Personal interview with J. Paul Grayson, June 9, 2014. For a trenchant analysis of
the case, see R. Moon, "Religious Accommodation and its Limits: The Recent Controversy at
York University" (2014) 23 (1) Constitutional Forum 9 [hereinafter "Moon"]. Religious freedom
does not always fit comfortably within an equality rights framework.

26
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 39
(S.C.C,) [hereinafter "Amselem"].
27
Id.
28
Of course, "sincerity" and "nexus" have their own substantive components but, as is well
known, these are relatively easy for a claimant to establish (however, see notes 35-40 and
accompanying text below for a sampling of cases where the courts have failed to find more than a
trivial infringement or a nexus with religion).
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beliefs connected to an individual spiritual faith and integrally linked to
one self-definition and spiritual fulfilment". The practice of religion
allows "individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the
subject or object of that spiritual faith.""
To see how this has played out in a constitutional law context, it is
worth examining some of the kinds of things that have been successfully
protected as religiously based activities in constitutional cases. For
example, wearing a kirpan to school in an environment where no weapons
are allowed;" avoiding having a photographic driver's licence where
drivers are expected to have one;3 ' seeking to install a private succah on
one's balcony (where built elements are forbidden) and a communal
succah is thought by others of the same faith to be acceptable;32 refusing
blood transfusions where the bulk of medical opinion suggests that to do
so could be fatal;` and refusing to participate in a daily prayer reading
where the bulk of students or staff are in favour of it.34
Just as instructive are those cases where a religious freedom was claimed
but a court found it not to exist, either because (i) the practice or belief has
no nexus with religion; or (ii) the interference was deemed to be trivial or
insubstantial. In category (i) are included such cases where a claimant's
belief that the cannabis plant is sacred to his "Church of the Universe" and
thus the use of marijuana is a religious one;" where the fact that the British
monarchy's royal-succession rules adhere to certain sectarian principles is
not connected to an individual's own religious beliefs;" and where the ideas
and practices of the Humanics Institute, including a "Oneness of Reality",
are so vague as to be practically unascertainable and therefore not connected

to religion.37 Cases where courts have found the interference to be trivial
include the challenge of a Calgary by-law prohibiting amplified sound
because it prohibited a person from attempting to proselytize to pedestrians
in front of City Hall;` a requirement to file annual tax returns being contrary
to a religious or conscientious belief because of government policies
allowing abortion;39 a Passport Canada policy that prohibited the inclusion
of "Israel" as the country of birth;" a Highway Traffic Act provision
requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets;41 and Sarnia zoning legislation that
prohibited a Christian fellowship organization from operating a men's
shelter,42
Once religious freedom is triggered by showing that a practice has a
nexus to religion, the question of whether the law's interference with the
implicated right is trivial or insubstantial is assessed objectively. If it is
found to be significant enough, then there is, prima fade, an infringement
of freedom of religion. That, the Supreme Court says, is enough.43
It's not a difficult burden to meet. Gurbaj Singh, a Sikh student in a
grade school in Quebec, was allowed to attend school wearing a kirpan
because he claimed it was a
a religious and ceremonial dagger
religious object and part of his duty as a religious practice to wear it.
Non-Sikhs, in contrast, are not allowed to carry knives. The Supreme
Court found that all Gurbaj had to do was establish that his personal and
subjective belief in the religious significance of the kirpan was sincere.
He did not have to establish that a kirpan isn't a weapon or that Sikhism
requires wearing one. The School had to accommodate his religious
belief since it was relatively straightforward to do so.
The rationale for treating the bulk of a freedom-of-religion claim in a
subjective manner is both practical and principled. Courts are public
there is no place for them in the pews of the nation. But
institutions
this subjective approach brings potential challenges. Under it, it is very
however unusual or even
hard for anyone to maintain that my belief
is not valid. There needs to
socially disruptive it might seem to others
-

-

-

Amselem, supra, note 26, at para. 39 (emphasis added).
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1
S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.).
31
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Wilson Colony"].
32
Amselem, supra, note 26.
u
B. (P) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1
S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.).
l
Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director), [1988] O.J. No. 1488, 65 OR.
(2d) 641 (Ont. CA.). Of course, not all of these cases were ultimately successful, but all passed the
first hurdle of establishing a breach of freedom of religion. The cases almost all turn on whether the
government is justified in limiting the freedom under s. 1 of the Charter, but that is less relevant to
the purpose intended here.
°
Bennett v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] F,C,J. No. 1598, 2011 FC 1310 (F.C.),
revd [2013] F.C.J. No. 717, 2013 FCA 161 (F.C.A.).
36
Chainnigh v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] F.C.J. No. 53, 2008 FC 69 (F.C.).
°

-

-

"
Humanics Institute v. Minister of National Revenue, [2014] F.C.J, No. 1127, 2014 FCA
265 (F.C.A.).
'°
R. v. Pawlowski, [2011] A.J. No. 189, 509 AR. 1 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter "Pawlowski").
39
R. v. Little, [2009] N.B.J. No. 276,349 N.B.R. (2d) 54,246 C. C.C. (3d) 508 (N.B.C.A.).
°
Veffer v. Canada (Minister ofForeign Affairs), [2007] F.C.J. No. 908, 2007 FCA 247 (F.C.A.).
41
R. v. Badesha, [2011] O.J. No. 2564, 2011 ONCJ 284 (Ont. C.J.).
42
Sarnia (City) v. River City Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Sarnia (Trustees of), [2014]
O.J. No. 2193, 22 M.P.L.R. (5th) 35 (Ont. S.C.J.).
°
See S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Chénes, [20121 S.C.J. No, 7, [2012] 1 S.C .R. 235, at
para. 23 (S. C.C.),
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be sincerity in that belief and some connection to a basic idea of religion
(related to the divine, or spiritual faith), but nothing more than that. So
the York student fervently believed his religion did not allow contact
with females (at least in a student setting)." He was sincere in that belief
(at least initially; he later recanted in some way, since he ended up
attending the weekend session). The University accepted that belief and
determined that the only reasonable way to accommodate him was
granting a dispensation from the weekend retreat.
No doubt accommodation, which allows difference to flourish, may
sometimes seem unfair to those who must do the accommodating (and
even discriminatory to those who are not offered the same treatment).
Those feelings can be hard to shake, as attested by Grayson and a
significant number of the surveyed students who felt demeaned. But
accommodating religion is one legal method we use in Canada to strive for
a society that remains uninterested in religious beliefs. It's a necessary
paradox
by vigorously maintaining reasonable accommodation of
religious beliefs, we actually protect the secular nature of our state. In my
view, this is an important value to maintain.45
But secularity is not the same as neutrality. As a way around this false
equivalence, in terms of religious legal disputes, it might be useful
sometimes to frame them as grounded in conscience instead of religion.
Non-religious viewpoints, based on claims of conscience, can function in
a similar way to the comprehensive claims to the truth made by religions.
Conscience-based claims are, for want of a better term, secular, but they
also comprise a distinct point of view and therefore are not "neutral". As
Suzanne Chiodo reasons, casting secularism as neutral makes it the

arbiter of "non-neutral" claims, especially religion. While public debate
is centred around so-called neutral claims based on reason, more
controversial claims of comprehensive truth are, she argues, relegated to
the background because they cannot be resolved through reason.46 Not,
I argue, if we give more weight to the Charter protection of conscience.
Section 2(a) of the Charter47 states that everyone has freedom of
conscience and religion. Yet the constitutional protection of conscience
is, at best, just a silent partner to religion and, at worst, often ignored or
unnoticed. I have argued that the deliberate inclusion of "conscience" in
section 2(a) of the Charter ought to be taken seriously; to do so, freedom
of conscience must be recognized as an independent and robust freedom.
A fully developed freedom of conscience might bring a less divisive,
morality-based freedom into the foreground as the primary freedom,
subsuming some forms of religious freedom within it and ultimately
proving less contentious and less driven by emotion.48 The Supreme
Court has hinted at a more robust approach to section 2(a) in a few asides
in some of its religious-freedom cases: "conscience" could include such
things as "conscientiously-held beliefs grounded in secular morality";"
the positions of "atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned"';"
and "profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself,
humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of
being."51

44

And despite the fact that some commentators noted that there is no religion they are
aware of that forbids such a practice: see, for example, Grayson's statement that he consulted a
scholar of Judaism and two Islamic scholars, neither of whom saw any religious reason for a person
not wanting to interact with women (supra, note 13, at 4) and S. Khan, "What York University
forgot: Gender equality is not negotiable", The Globe and Mail, January 10, 2014, available online:
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com]globedebate/whatyorkuniver5ityforgotgeflderequaljtyisno.
negotiable/artic1e16278726/>. (Khan characterizes the student's request as one based on cultural
preference, not religious doctrine.)
°
It might be much more preferable to think of the nature of our state as "impartial"
more analogous to judges, who are permitted to hold opinions and have sympathies but throughout
must be seen to be impartial (i.e., without bias). In fact, the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical
Principles for Judges" refrains from using the term "neutral", preferring "impartial" throughout. Our
secular state should be free from bias as between different conceptions of the truth, of goodness, etc.,
but perhaps can never be neutral, since that implies there is some baseline position that somehow can
be located. That said, I'm not unaware of the controversy over defining the term "secularism" and
the fact that it has been described more as a continuun of ideas rather than a fixed concept; see
Simoneau v. Tremblay, L201 11 Q.H.R.T.J. No. 1, [2011] R.J.Q. 507 (Que. H.R,T,).
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46
s Chiodo, "Reconsidering Creed: Exchanging Secularism for Genuine Pluralism in
Canadian Human Rights Discourse", Creed (Ontario Human Rights Commission Legal Workshop
Papers, 2012) [hereinafter "Creed Report"].
47
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter "Charter"].
48
My doctoral dissertation was based on this premise: "A Burl on the Living Tree: Freedom
of Conscience in s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (University of Toronto,
2012). See also R. Haigh and P. Bowal, "Whistleblowing and Freedom of Conscience: Towards a
New Legal Analysis" (Spring, 2012) 35 Dalhousie L.J. 89 and H. Kislowicz, R. Haigh and A. Ng,
"Calculations of Conscience: The Costs and Benefits of Religious and Conscientious Freedom"
(2011) Alta. L. Rev. 679-714.
49
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 179 (S.C.C.) (Wilson J.
concurring in result).
50
Wilson Colony, supra, note 31, at para. 90 (citing the European Court in Kokkinakis v.
Greece (May 25, 1993), Series A no, 260-A (E.C.H.R.)).
51
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [19861 2 S.C.R. 713, at 759
(5 CC.), quoted in Pawlowski, supra, note 38, at para. 88. A few lower court cases have relied on
the conscience arm of s. 2(a) in their reasoning: for example (not an exhaustive list), see R. v. Lewis,
[1996] B.C.J. No. 1254, 36 C.R.R. (2d) 364 (B.C.S.C.); Roach v. Canada (Minister of State for
Multiculturalism and Citizenship), [1994] F.C.J. No. 33, [1994] 2 F.C. 406 (F.C.T.D.) and Maurice
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] F.C.J. No. 72, [2002] 215 F.T.R. 315 (F.C.T.D.).

218

219

RELIGION, LIBERTY AND THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF LAW

SHOULD CONSCIENCE BE A PROXY FOR RELIGION

Undoubtedly, religion and conscience have much in common both
historically and theoretically. But in a legal, constitutional sense they
should be treated separately. Freedom of conscience can function as a fully
realized, independent freedom, since its meaning is sufficiently distinct
from "religion". Different religions and individual consciences manifest
themselves in a nearly limitless variety of forms, often diametrically
opposed to one another. The major religions, for example, have vastly
different views on what might be the ultimate purpose or divine
understanding of the universe. Even more everyday religious beliefs (or
social customs that often are associated with religious practices) can lead
in different directions: many Jews and Muslims do not eat pork, while
many Hindus do not eat beef each of them relate these practices to
religious dogma. We can see similar effects surrounding conscience-based
beliefs: Martin Luther's conscience compelled him to attack the Catholic
Church while Thomas More's required him to defend it. Conscientious
objectors feel compelled to object to military service while others may
have a conscientious belief that fighting and dying for one's country is the
best path. As Wilhelm Mensching says, two people can arrive at opposite
conclusions and yet both can be making a decision based on conscience.52
All of this means that claims of constitutional freedom of conscience can
be modelled on requirements that are similar to the way religious-freedom
claims have been delineated in cases such as Amselem.
This is where the law relating to the anti-vaccinationists and the York
rule regarding male-only students part ways. I believe we should
take seriously the difference that the role of conscience plays between
each set of cases. The Immunization of School Pupils Act expressly
acknowledges the idea that conscience can be a determining factor in a
parent deciding whether to allow her child to be inoculated. As Minister
of Health Norton noted, the reason for adding conscience to the law in
1984 was a direct result of the wording of section 2(a) of the Charter,
which suggested conscience as a fundamental freedom distinct from
religion: "[i]n trying to bring this bill clearly into compliance with the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it extends the grounds of exemption
to include
matters of conscience. ,53
In contrast, a large part of the furor in the York case arose out of a
(misplaced) belief that the student's claim was another in a long line of

examples that showed how out of touch some religious ideas (notably, and
frequently, those associated with radical Islam) are to a modern state such
as Canada. This view is usually couched in more palatable language, but at
its heart is a feeling that some religions, or some religious practices, are
inferior and less deserving of protection than others.
However, if we imagine a slightly different situation at York, we can see
how arguments based on conscience might tease out new ways to view
religious arguments. If a student claimed he could not sit down with female
students because it has been instilled in him since birth by his parents that it
is wrong to sit together for long periods of time if you are not married,
would we feel differently? Would our answer change if the student had been
told his entire life that men are superior and should not demean themselves
by meeting with women?" These questions respond to suspect values that
may have been culturally or socially instilled. What about a belief that relies,
instead, on "science" that may be suspect: the student could not sit with the
opposite gender because mixing genders can lead to serious problems of
germ transference and a heightened chance of infection?
How to assess such conscience-based reasons? Would they be treated
differently? Is the reason for the conscience-based exemption itself
important? If it is, does this mean the reason for a religious-based
exemption is important too? Yet, since religious accommodation is
granted without inquiring into the religious basis for the reason, should
not conscience- and religion-based arguments be treated the same?
Would the possibility of accommodating these reasons change your view
of the religious accommodation?
Oftentimes (though not always!), I think assessing religious claims
is analogous to Justice Potter Stewart's famous dictum regarding
pornography: "I know it when I see it."" Religious claims raise considerable

...

W. Mensching, Conscience (Ian Hagerty & Caroline Nicholson Jacob, trs., Pendle Hill
Pamphlets, 1961), at 10-11.
n
flansard Debates, supra, note 5.
2

54
See Canada Trust Co v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1990] O.J. No. 615, 74 O.R.
(2d) 481 (Ont. CA.); also see Spence v. BMO Trust Company, [2015] O.J. No. 353, 123 O.R. (3d) 611
(Out. S.C.J.) (revd [2016] O.J. No. 1162, 2016 ONCA 196 (Ont. CA,). In Spence, the trial judge found
that a deceased's will against public policy as it cut out a daughter who had married and bore a child
with a Caucasian husband. Although the Court of Appeal reversed, one could say that the trial decision
took the public notion of human rights about as far into the private-law realm as it can go.
n
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964 U.S.S.C.) (concurring). The exact text of his
judgment was "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing
so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." Paul Gewirtz
has written an excellent article on how this phrase is much more than a judicial cop-out and, in fact,
contains much that should be admired in legal reasoning (in essence, the importance of non-rational
elements in judicial decision-making): P. Gewirtz, "On 'I Know it When I See it", (1996) 105 Yale
L.J. 1023.
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emotional responses. We should acknowledge, as Potter Stewart J. did, the
non-rational in helping us through these difficult questions. Many
clinicians and public health workers exhibit frustration over vaccine
hesitancy; it is all too common a belief that with additional education and
rational understanding the hesitancy will go away.56 The truth is more
complicated: this kind of wishful thinking is based on underestimating the
power of non-cognitive dimensions of religiosity and of other deeply held
convictions. Thinking about religious claims in the broader terms provided
by conscience provides a helpful way out of this short-sightedness
it
functions somewhat the same as knowing pornography when you see it. It
helps legitimize and provide additional context to some claims at the same
time it may assist in pointing out more clearly others that are spurious.
If one is able to test claims by substituting a conscience-based reason
for the religious one, interesting things sometimes happen. Take Wilson
Colony, Multani and Mouvement laIque québécois v. Saguenay (City) 57 as
examples. If we change the Wilson Colony claimants from Hutterites to
conscientious objectors who believe strongly against having identity
photographs taken, would the situation change? Similarly, would we feel
the same about a schoolchild who wished to bring a knife to school
because he felt compelled to do so for reasons related to his conscience?
One's reaction to these questions can help situate the problem when it is
presented as a religious claim.
One of the Supreme Court of Canada's more recent religious-freedom
claims centred around religiously tinged municipal council meetings
(because they included recitation of a prayer before the business of the
meeting began)." Would it be a problem if, instead of reciting the Lord's
Prayer at a civic meeting, a mayor recited some message about virtue,
peace, and the human spirit? It is hard to imagine anyone taking issue
with this: it would not offend either one's freedom of religion or of
conscience. Because the message is somewhat anodyne, and certainly
unlikely to offend, it most likely would be tolerated. If this is true, then
sometimes a "secular" version of activities that have religious referents
may be considered acceptable (assuming for the sake of argument that
-
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my simplified mayoral statements are treated as a form of consciencebased speech). It is not because of their secular nature, however, that I
think these kinds of readings would pass constitutional muster. It is
because they are examples of conscience-based information that are panreligious and universal. A reading by a mayor that is deliberately focused
on one religion is not acceptable in a pluralist society. In contrast, a
if the mayor said, before each meeting, "We wish
moral admonition
that everyone here does good" - is uncontroversial only because it
would likely pass as valid for every religion known to humans. In sum,
when replaced with a conscience-based claim, the religious analysis can
sometimes be sharpened.
Of course, thinking of potential flashpoints in terms of conscience as
opposed to religion is not a panacea. Conscience-based claims make sense
in two main cases: (i) where a legislature determines that there may be
good reasons, even if non-rational, for broadening religious-based claims
to include similar conscience-based ones; and (ii) where the framing of
the analytical problem is relatively straightforward. The first case is
easiest: the classic conscience-based objection to a law occurred where
pacifists objected to mandatory military service. As with the evolution
of vaccination exemptions described at the outset of this chapter,
conscientious objection to military service was originally granted to those
religions that forbade going to war. Later on, governments allowed nonreligious conscientious objectors to exempt themselves from military
service.59 In both situations, however, those in charge of assessing the
veracity of the belief were clear that a person was only eligible to make the
claim if they had a profound and demonstrable objection to war. In
contrast, many would argue that parents who seek a vaccine exemption for
their child are doing so based on purely unfounded, unscientific beliefs (or,
at a minimum, highly contestable empirical evidence).60 So, if it makes
sense for governments to allow for religious exemptions because some
religions are opposed to the practice, then it makes sense to allow for
conscientious exemptions on the basis that conscience-based beliefs are
little different from subjective religious beliefs.
-

56

Thus, Bill 198's modification to the Act requiring parents undergo an "education session"
prior to obtaining an exemption from immunization see supra, note 1.
'
[2015] S.C.J. No. 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
58
These are the basic facts that gave rise to the dispute in Mouvement laique qué béco is v.
Saguenay (City), id. In that decision, the Court reasoned that at a public meeting of a municipal
council, a mayor should refrain from prayer, or other sectarian religious activities, as these are
exclusionary. The Court took a fairly strong stand about "neutrality" of the State, which may run
counter to some of the arguments I mentioned above (see, supra, text to notes 44-45).

n
See, for example, G. Ruebsaat, The First Freedom: Freedom of Conscience and Religion
in Canada, Freedom of Conscience Series No. 2 (Victoria, B.C.: Conscience Canada Inc., 1989).
60
A typical rationalist account is summarized in a piece by André Picard, the Globe and
Mail's health reporter: A. Picard, "Vaccination is for the greater good" in The Globe and Mail,
February 3, 2015, at Al2. Picard's colourful language is instructive: "beliefs are rooted in scientific
ignorance ... and it's much easier to find unabashed nonsense than easily digestible scientific fact
"a chilling disregard for rational argument".
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The second case, that presented by the York University situation, is
more difficult. Examined through the frame of religious accommodation,
the student should be offered an alternative to meeting with other
students. The student felt that his religious freedom, as described in the
Charter and the Ontario Human Rights Code, was infringed. As the
University determined, he met the three requirements that determine
whether accommodation is required.6 ' There is no requirement to go
behind the subjectivity of the claimant's belief. In other words, just as
abstaining from eating pork may not be strictly rational, or scientifically
valid, it is protected simply because it is a religious and cultural practice
for some believers. In my view, if this was the end of the argument, then
a conscience-based reason for an accommodation should exist as well.
However, because the problem can also be framed as one of equality, it is
more complex. A significant number of female students in the class felt
they were being discriminated against because of their gender, also
contrary to the Charter and the Ontario Human Rights Code. To them,
accommodation of any sort is tantamount to condoning discrimination.
Since the case is capable of two diametrically opposed analyses, adding
conscience to the mix is of limited utility. The real struggle is determining
how the problem should be framed.62
In the end, I believe that the Ontario Government's approach to
vaccination is the best route to go
wherever possible, expressly
allowing conscience and religion to be used in tandem, wherever there
are activities that are open to a variety of approaches, clarifies the law
and could help to move more problems inside the two categories
described above.
In addition, allowing conscience to operate instead of, or in addition to,
religion may help defuse delicate situations. As the Ontario Government
report on school immunization notes, parents' decisions whether to exempt
their children on the basis of religious reasons as opposed to philosophical
reasons has been completely uncontroversial." The conscience and
religious exemptions are both accepted as bases for refusing inoculation.
As with religious accommodation, allowing claims based on philosophical
or conscience-based reasons is fundamentally about preventing marginalization of minority groups and the negative effect on the dignity of
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individuals whose identity is connected with such groups .6' What if the
York rules allowed students to opt out of certain components of a course
for "religious or conscientious reasons" without having to explain further
the reason for so doing? Would it change the way we characterize and
assess the exemption? My guess is that it would.65
Our relative peacefulness in Canada the lack of killings over religious
is not something we have stumbled upon or
cartoons, for instance
realized through luck. We have aligned the law with an ideal but practical
kind of justice: developing broad approaches to religious accommodation
and allowing, in a few instances, non-religious conscientious beliefs to be
equally protected. Accommodations have generally worked, albeit with
some controversy. Perhaps adding conscience protection to many other
will further improve our
where it makes obvious sense
situations
ability to withstand complex and difficult cultural, political, sociological,
religious and legal entanglements. A modern Canada deserves no less.
-

-

-

-

-

64
See R. Moon, "Accommodation and Compromise under s. 2(a) of the Charter", Creed
Report, supra, note 46, at 59.1.
65
As sociologists have noted, people tend to "mix and match" components of religion in
idiosyncratic and often contradictory ways: see R. Bibby, Unknown Gods: The Ongoing Story of
as
Religion in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993). And the growth of "no religion" is increasing
Siobhan Chandler notes, the "spiritual but not religious" (SBNR) subculture is on the increase; see
S. Chandler, "Private religion in the public sphere: inner life spirituality in civil society" in S. Aspers &
D. Houtman, eds., Religions of Modernity: Relocating the Sacred to the Self and the Digital (Leiden:
Brill, 2010), at 69. It is one reason why both religious- and conscience-based reasons for refusing to
vaccinate one's children is troubling for many health care practitioners but is a key component of a
strong belief in personal autonomy. Many similarities would exist in a classroom setting,
-

61
62
63

See text to supra, note 13.
See Moon, supra, note 25, for an expanded version of this argument.
The Report, supra, note 11.

